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Abstract. In this paper we investigate whether grades are used by educational institutions as a competition 
variable to attract and retain students. Using a sample of almost 26,000 students enrolled at an Italian University, 
we document that grades vary significantly across degrees. After controlling for students’ characteristics, class-
size, classmates’ quality and degree fixed effects, it emerges that students obtain better grades and are less likely 
to drop-out when their degree course experiences an excess of supply. We adopt an instrumental variable strategy 
to account for endogeneity problems and instrument the excess of supply by using the total number of universities 
offering each  degree course. Our IV estimates confirm that the teaching staff on degree course facing low 
demand tend to set lower academic standards with the result that their students obtain better grades and have a 
lower probability of dropping out than they might otherwise. 
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1. Introduction 
In a sense, educational institutions are “delegated” by society to evaluate students’ skills and to signal 
them to the labour market. However, there is a large debate on whether these institutions have the right 
incentives to play this role: grades may not be awarded simply to signal student ability and productivity, 
but may be used as a variable to compete with other educational institutions. In fact, when employers 
cannot observe skills, schools and universities may have an interest in positively biasing evaluations in 
order to attract more students or reduce their own effort.  
This kind of incentive may operate not only in private institutions, whose revenues are clearly 
based on enrolment, but also in public educational institutions where the allocation of state resources 
among schools, universities and departments is based fully or partially on the number of students 
enrolled or on the number of exams passed by students. 
Economic literature has considered this problem with regards to primary and secondary 
education, focusing the attention mainly on the advantages of centralised examination systems (Bishop, 
1996; Bishop, 1997; Bishop and Woessman, 2004; Woessman, 2005). The issue seems to be even more 
                                                          
* I would like to thank the editor Bernd Fitzenberger, two anonymous referees, Vincenzo Scoppa, Giorgio 
Brunello, Alessandra Antonelli for their very useful comments, the administration of University of Calabria for 
providing access to the data and Anna Russo, Monya Perricone and Alessandro Sole for providing assistance 
with the use of the data. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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relevant for post-secondary education, since grade inflation and grade divergence are well documented 
phenomena among both American and European Universities.  
“Grade inflation” is a term coined to describe the tendency to inflate grades, that is to reduce the 
academic standards which lead to given levels of grades being awarded (Anglin and Meng, 2000; 
Mansfield, 2001; Shea, 1994; Stone, 1995; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2003), while grade divergence 
describes situations in which grading standards differ across universities, departments, and professors in 
the same field (Bagues, Sylos Labini and Zinoyeva, 2008; Becker, 1997; Boero et al., 2001; Shea, 
1994).  
Inconsistent grading may have a notable impact both inside and outside educational institutions. 
In fact, it is argued that grade inflation and grade divergence reduce the value of grades as signals of 
productivity and then the capacity of employers to select from the pool of graduates (Chan et al., 2007). 
In addition, students may be attracted, in their enrolment decisions and field choices, by departments 
that offer easy grading even though they might entail poor labour market perspectives (Bratti and 
Staffolani, 2001). This can generate mismatch between qualifications acquired by students and skills 
required in the labour market, with an excessive number of students graduating in fields for which there 
is little demand. Easy grading practices may also have negative effects on the educational system itself, 
since they negatively influence students’ incentives to provide effort in studying activities and in 
knowledge acquisition (Figlio and Lucas, 2003) and reduce pressure on college administrators to 
improve teaching quality (Bishop and Woessman, 2004).  
Where the allocation of resources among universities and departments is based fully or partially 
on the number of enrolled students, grade inflation and divergence may also produce distributional 
effects. Distributional effects are also produced among students. In fact, as shown by Chan et al. (2007), 
the welfare of good students is negatively effected by grade inflation, whereas mediocre students obtain 
a higher level of welfare than they would otherwise. Other distributional issues emerge when grants, 
scholarships, honours of various sort and subsidised taxation schemes are awarded simply on the basis 
of students’ performance without taking into consideration the students’ field of study, the university 
attended and differences in curricula. 
The tendency to inflate grades has been explained in several ways. Chan et al. (2007) explain 
grade inflation assuming that employers cannot perfectly distinguish between a situation in which an 
educational institution (a school or a university) is giving lots of good grades and a situation in which 
the institution has a large number of good students. This lack of information induces the educational 
institution to award high grades to some of its low-ability students too. De Paola and Scoppa (2007) 
point out that educational standards may be influenced by labour market conditions and that lower 
standards emerge when skills are scarcely rewarded. Freeman (1999) argues that universities and 
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departments adopt grading policies which are inversely commensurate to the market benefits of their 
courses. In a similar vein, Dickens, 1984, and Staples, 1998, argue that easy grading practices are used 
to attract more students so as to avoid poorly attended courses being closed. In addition, university 
instructors may inflate their grades in order to avoid negative evaluations by students, since these 
evaluations are often considered by faculties in their promotion and tenure decisions (Krautmann and 
Sander, 1999).  
In this work we propose a simple theoretical model showing that, when students positively 
evaluate high grades and when resources are allocated in relation to the number of students enrolled and 
the number of exams they pass, grading policies may be used by universities or departments as a 
competition variable to attract and retain students. In addition, we show that the incentive to inflate 
grades is higher for universities or degree courses facing low demand. This framework guides the 
empirical investigation which follows. We use a rich data set providing detailed information on grades 
obtained in each course by a sample of almost 26,000 students enrolled on different degree courses 
offered by a middle size Italian University and estimate the relationship between students’ academic 
performance (in terms of grades obtained and probability of dropping out) and the demand for their 
degree course. Since, as a result of the reforms implemented in Italy during the early 90s, funds are 
partially allocated to universities and departments in relation to the number of students enrolled and to 
the number of exams passed by students2, easy grading practices may well be used by among different 
degree courses to attract and retain students.  
Students may positively evaluate high grades both because they have a taste for them (and easy 
grading standards usually imply a lower probability of failing exams) and because, in the absence of 
perfect information, high grades may lead to higher rewards in the labour market. As a consequence, 
enrolment decisions may be influenced by the difficulty of different degree courses as well as by 
students’ preferences and ability (Bar et al. 2007). One may suggest that this kind of information is 
generally not available in advance of applying to university. However, students actually enrolled 
represent an important channel for information diffusion, especially when they reside in the same 
geographical area as prospective students3. 
Easy grading standards may also be aimed at avoiding students’ dropping outs because degree 
courses experiencing low demanded may fear loss of resources or, in extreme cases, closure. While it is 
very rare that a university in Italy will decide to shut down a degree course because of low demand, the 
number of courses offered is strictly related to the number of students enrolled (especially after the first 
year when students have more opportunity to choose among different courses). 
                                                          
2 See Perotti (2002) for a description of the Italian university financial system. 
3 The great majority of students enrolled at the University of Calabria are resident in the same region in which the 
University is located. 
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Studies considering these issues generally measure demand as the number of students enrolled in 
each degree course (Dickens, 1984; Staples, 1998) and, as a consequence, they are not able to 
disentangle class-size effects from effects due to endogenous grading standards. Thanks to the quality 
of our data set, we are able to overcome this problem. In fact, we have information on the class-size of 
courses attended by each student and on the number of places offered compared with the number of 
applications received for each degree course. We use this information to evaluate whether the grading 
standards adopted by different degree courses are influenced by the demand they enjoy compared to the 
number of places they offer, controlling for class-size effects.  
We first estimate a simple OLS model of grades obtained by students in their first year exams. 
From our results it emerges that, controlling for class-size, classmates’ quality and degree fixed effects, 
students obtain better grades when their degree course experiences an excess of supply. Since our 
analysis builds on information concerning individuals who decided to attend different degree courses, 
OLS estimates are consistent as long as these individuals do not select different degree courses 
according to their unobservable characteristics. Moreover, degree courses which experience an excess 
of supply may share some unobservable time variant features, for example, in terms of teaching quality. 
In order to overcome these problems, we instrument the excess of supply variable with the total number 
of Universities which offer each degree course using a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation. 
Our TSLS estimates confirm that students obtain better grades when their degree course experiences an 
excess of supply.  
 We also analyse, by estimating a probit model, whether aspects related to supply and demand 
effect the probability of students’ dropping out. It emerges that students enrolled in degree courses 
which experience an excess of supply have a lower probability of dropping out of their academic 
studies. Two-Stage Probit estimates confirm this result. 
 The paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 a simple theoretical model is 
proposed. In section 3 data are presented and some descriptive statistics are offered. In section 4 we 
document the fact that grades vary significantly across fields and across degrees and investigate 
whether grades obtained by students are influenced by the total demand for the degree course they have 
chosen. Section 5 presents Two-Stage Least Squares estimates. Section 6 is devoted to analysing the 
probability of students’ dropping out in relation to demand-supply factors. In this section both Probit 
and Two-Stage Probit estimates are reported. Section 7 concludes. 
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 2. Theoretical Set-up 
In this section we present a simple model of students’ choice of degree course. Let us assume that 
there are two horizontally differentiated degree courses 2 ,1=d , located at the end points of a line 
segment, such as in Hotelling (1929). This line represents students’ preferences for degree courses. In 
fact, students have different tastes regarding fields of study and they suffer a cost when they cannot 
choose their preferred degree course. More precisely, we assume that the cost relating to having chosen 
course 1 is represented by the distance at which the student’s ideal course lies from the location of 
course 1, denoted by t , and that the cost relating to the distance of the student’s ideal course from the 
location of course 2 is denoted by t−1 . Students are homogeneous in every respect apart from cost t , 
which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Each student enrols on a degree course.  
As explained in the introduction, students may positively evaluate high grades for several 
reasons. To encompass this idea in our model, we simply assume that students obtain utility from 
grades they get during their university studies. In addition, we assume that that their utility depends 
positively on the economic and social payoffs (wage, status, etc) deriving from graduating in a certain 
field, which, for the sake of simplicity, are independent of grades. These payoffs, dB , are field specific, 
since different degree courses may lead to different economic and social outcomes. 
Let us suppose that the grade, g , obtained by student j, enrolled in degree course d , is equal to 
his effective skills, s, plus a term i , which corresponds to grade inflation,.Therefore: djd isg += . 
Students will only select the degree course 1 if the following condition holds: 
[1]                   )t(isBtisB −−++>−++ 12211  
where 1B  and 2B  denote payoffs obtained by subjects who have graduated in field 1 and 2 
respectively, and 1i  and 2i  denote grade inflation chosen by the two different degree courses. 
Taking into account the fact that students are homogenous in every respect, except for cost t , and 
that  t  is uniformly distributed, it is possible to find a threshold value of tˆ : 
[2]                    
2
1ˆ 2121 iiBBt −+−+=  
Only students with a cost t  which is lower than the threshold value tˆ  will choose degree course 
1. It is easy to show that when 21 BB =  and 21 ii =  half of the students enrol on degree course 1.  
We assume that resources are allocated, by a central authority, to the two degrees courses in 
relation to the number of students enrolled and the average number of exams passed by those students. 
However, since in many countries resources are only partially allocated in relation to the number of 
students and the number of exams, we assume that total resources obtained by each degree course 
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increase less than proportionately to the increase in the number of students enrolled and to the average 
number of exams they pass4. More precisely, the total amount of resources obtained by degree d takes 
the following form: ( ) ( )( )βα rieNrR d+=  where N is the number of students enrolled, r the resources 
obtained for each student, )( die  denotes the average number of exams passed by students, which is 
positively related to grade inflation di , and α  and β  are parameters taking values greater that zero and 
lower than 1. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that dd i)i(e = . 
When deciding its grading policy, each degree course takes into account the influence that this 
choice will have on the resources provided by the central authority. However, grade inflation may also 
generate costs, for example in terms of reputation. In order to take this aspect into account, we simply 
assume that degrees suffer a cost )i(c d  from grade inflation. As a consequence, grade inflation is 
decided upon by each degree course in order to maximise the following utility function:  
[3]               ( ) ( ) )i(criNrU ddd −+= βα  
Now, let us consider the utility function of degree course 1. In this case the number of students 
enrolled is equal to ∫
−+−+
=
2
1
0
2121 iiBB
dt)t(fN . Solving the integral and substituting it into equation [3] leads 
to: 
[4]              ( ) )i(cririiBBU dd −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+= β
α
2
1 2121
1  
A similar equation can be obtained for degree course 2.  
The optimal grade inflation policy adopted by degree course 1 satisfies the following first order 
condition (FOC):  
[5]               ( ) 0
22
1
1
1
1
2121
1
1 =−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+=∂
∂ −− )i(crirrriiBB
i
U '
d
β
α
βα  
The FOC implicitly represents the reaction function of degree course 1 with respect to variables 
chosen by its competitor (degree course 2). An analogous reaction function can be obtained for degree 
course 2.  
Therefore, our model is defined by the two following implicit functions: 
                                                          
4 These assumptions describe the Italian University funding system quite closely. In fact, since the 1993 reform in 
Italy (law 537/1993), each university is an autonomous entity with its own budget, which has to be allocated 
across different disciplines following a number of rules which state that a part of public funds has to be 
distributed on a historical basis and the rest is to be allocated via an “Equalization Component”. This component 
depends positively on the number of student enrolled weighted by discipline standard unit cost and on the number 
of exams passed by students enrolled (see Bagues et al., 2008 and Perotti, 2002) 
 7
[6]               ( ) 0
22
1
1
1
1
1
2121
1 =−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+= −
−
)i(crirrriiBBF 'i
β
α
βα   
[7]               ( ) 0
22
1
1
1
1
1
1212
2 =−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+= −
−
)i(crirrriiBBF 'i
β
α
βα  
Second-order conditions for a maximum require that 011 <iiF  and 022 <iiF  (which are satisfied given 
our assumptions) and that the determinant of the Hessian (composed by the second derivatives) is 
positive: 
0
2212
211 1 >
iiii
iiii
FF
FF
 
 
It is easy to verify that 012212211 >− iiiiiiii FFFF  implying that the Jacobian J  of this system with respect 
to the endogenous variables 1i  and 2i  does not vanish at the optimal values and allowing us to study 
the comparative static properties. Taking the total differentials of [6] and [7] and allowing the 
endogenous variables 1i  and 2i  to vary, together with all the relevant exogenous variables, we obtain: 
 
 02111221111 21 =∂+∂+∂+∂ BFBFiFiF BiBiiiii  
[8]  
 02212212222 21 =∂+∂+∂+∂ BFBFiFiF BiBiiiii  
 
The equation system in [8] can be written in matrix form as: 
 
[9]   
2212
2111
2
1
2212
2111
21
21
BFBF
BFBF
i
i
FF
FF
BiBi
BiBi
iiii
iiii
∂−∂−
∂−∂−=∂
∂
 
 
We are now interested in showing how grading practices followed by each degree course are 
effected by demand conditions. We proceed by considering that an increase in 1B  produces an increase 
in demand for degree course 1 and then we investigate how the degree course adjusts its grading policy 
in response to this change.  
Using Cramer’s rule to obtain 11 Bi ∂∂ , and taking other exogenous variables as equal to zero, it 
is possible to show that an increase in 1B  produces a reduction in grade inflation 1i . In fact: 
[10]                                +
++−− +−=∂
∂
J
FFFF
B
i BiiiiiBi 12211
1
1 221  
where: 
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( )
42
11
22
2121
11
rriiBBF Bi
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−=
α
αα  
( ) ( ) ( ) 2122
2
1212
22 142
11 −
−
−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−= β
α
ββαα rirrriiBBF ii  
( )
42
11
22
2121
21
rriiBBF ii
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−−=
α
αα  
( )
42
11
22
2121
21
rriiBBF Bi
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−−=
α
αα  
 
by substituting these equations into the numerator of equation [10], we obtain the following: 
[11]   ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
42
111 21
42
2121
12211 221
<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−−−=+− −
−
β
α
ββαα rirriiBBFFFF BiiiiiBi  
 
Equation [11] is negative, implying that an increase in 1B  has a negative effect on the grade 
inflation decided upon by degree course 1. As a consequence, an exogenous increase in demand for 
degree course 1 induces the degree course to adopt a tough grading policy. 
We can, therefore, conclude that degree courses facing, for exogenous reasons, low demand tend 
to inflate their grades more compared to degrees enxperiencing higher demand. In the next section we 
will submit this theoretical prediction to empirical scrutiny by using data from an Italian University. 
 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
Our empirical analysis relies upon individual-level data using a sample of 25,825 first-year 
undergraduate students enrolled at the University of Calabria, a middle-sized public university located 
in the South of Italy, collected between the academic years 2001-02 and 2006-075. The University of 
Calabria currently has about 33,000 students, who are enrolled in different degrees and at different 
levels of the Italian University system. This system is, in line with the University Reform of 2001 
following the 1999 EU Convention in Bologna, organised into two main levels constituted by First 
Level Degrees (legal duration of 3 years) and Second Level Degrees (a further 2 years duration). The 
reform reduced the original official duration for undergraduate courses from four or five years to three 
                                                          
5 The university of Calabria was ranked second in the 2004 list of Italian public universities of similar size for the 
relative quality of its services, infrastructure, computerisation and financial support for students. See the ranking 
at http://www.repubblica.it/speciale/2004/censis/classifiche/mediatenei.html 
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years (introducing First Level Degrees) and has greatly increased the variety of curricula offered 
introducing a large number of new degrees. 
The students in our sample are enrolled in different fields (Economics, Pharmacy, Engineering, 
Humanities, Mathmatics and the Natural Sciences, and Political Sciences) and on different First Level 
Degree courses (hereafter FLD) within the same fields. The number of FLD offered within the same 
field ranges from 3 (Political Sciences) to 12 (Humanities)6. 
In order to gain a FLD, students have to obtain a total of 180 credits (each successfully 
accomplished course gives a number of credits ranging from 1-10). From our dataset, information is 
available regarding grades obtained on each course, the date of each exam, year of enrolment, students’ 
province of residence, type of high school attended by students and their final high school grade. 
Unfortunately, our dataset does not provide information on socio-economic and family background. 
However, the type of high school attended by students has been found to correlate highly with this 
missing information (see Checchi, 2006)7. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics. About 54 percent of students are female. Students 
mainly come from two different types of high school: Lyceums (about 43%) and Technical and 
Vocational Schools (about 57%). Final high school grade (which we denote throughout the paper as 
HSFinal) ranges from 60 to 100, with a mean of about 84. The average ability (measured considering 
HSFinal) of students varies considerably across fields. Students with higher HSfinal tend to be enrolled 
in Engineering (for students enrolled in this field HSfinal has a mean of 87), while those with lower 
ability tend to be enrolled in Pharmacy (the mean of HSFinal is 79). 
We only consider exams that they have undertaken during the first year of their degree in order to 
avoid selection problems which might emerge if students enrolled in the same FLD select courses 
characterised by different levels of difficulty. In fact, first year courses are compulsory introductory 
courses, whereas students have the possibility to choose between different courses offered by their FLD 
during the following years.  
Our sample of students, composed of 25,825 individuals, passed a total number of 162,899 exams 
and obtained an average grade of 24 during the first year of their FLD course. Grades range from 18 - 
                                                          
6 The fields which offer a relatively low number of FLD are Political Sciences, Pharmacy and Economics, with 
respectively 3, 4 and 5 different FLD. A relatively high number of FLD are offered by the Faculties of 
Humanities, Math and Sciences and Engineering. In these faculties, there can be found, respectively, 12, 9 and 9 
different FLD (for more detailed information see Table 1A in the Appendix). However, students enrolled in the 
Faculty of Engineering only decide which FLD to undertake at the end of their first semester and, as a 
consequence, only exams undertaken during the second semester change according to the chosen FLD. For this 
reason, we exclude students enrolled in this faculty in some of our regressions. 
7 In Italy, after compulsory education, students can decide to follow a “generalist” schooling track (Liceo), which 
is usually chosen by students from “better” family backgrounds, or a more labour market oriented schooling track 
(Istituti tecnici e professionali), usually chosen by students from “worse” family backgrounds. 
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the minimum pass mark - to 30. We do not have information on exams that students failed8.  
 Students attended their first year courses in classes of different sizes. We measure class-size  
by considering, for each year, the number of students enrolled in the same FLD and adjusting this 
number taking into account the maximum class-size admitted by law. The maximum number of 
students per class depends on the field of study (for example, the maximum class-size is of 230 
students for Economics) and FLD with a high intake of students have to split them into different 
classes. As a consequence, this measure of class-size is only partially influenced by the total number of 
students enrolled in each FLD. As shown in Table 1, class size has a mean of 147, and takes values  
between 1 and 310.  
 In our analysis we also control for classmate quality. As first year courses are compulsory, this 
measure of students’ quality considers the average ability (using HSFinal) of students that in the year t 
enrolled in the FLD chosen by student j.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample of students 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. Observations
Average Grade in First year exams 23.92     2.884 18 30 25825 
High School final grade 83.997     12.470 60   100 25825 
Female 0.545     0.498 0 1 25825 
High School Type: Lyceum 0.432     0.495 0   1 25825 
Economics 0.235   0.424 0 1 25825 
Pharmacy 0.067   0.250 0 1 25825 
Engineering 0.243  0.429 0 1 25825 
Humanities 0.256   0.437 0 1 25825 
Maths and Natural Sciences 0.114    0.317 0 1 25825 
Political Sciences 0.085    0.279 0 1 25825 
Year of enrolment 2001-2002  0.164     0.370 0 1 25825 
Year of enrolment 2002-2003 0.171     0.377 0 1 25825 
Year of enrolment 2003-2004 0.177     0.382   0 1 25825 
Year of enrolment 2004-2005 0.158     0.365 0   1 25825 
Year of enrolment 2005-2006 0.173     0.378 0 1 25825 
Year of enrolment 2006-2007 0.158     0.365 0   1 25825 
Classmate Quality 83.997    5.200     70.200 98.087       25825 
Class-size  147.331     57.737   1            310       25825 
Drop-outs    0.145     0.352 0 1 21748 
Excess-Supply  0.271   0 .444 0 1 25825 
Supply-Demand  -0.374     0.639 -3.137 0.940 25825 
      
  
Our data do not provide information on students who decided to drop out of university, 
however we have information on students who successfully undertook at least one exam during the 
second year of duration of their degree course. We use this information as a proxy for drop-out 
behaviour. About 14% of students drop-out in the second year, in fact 18,598 students passed at least 
                                                          
8 The great majority of Italian Universities do not record failed exams. 
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one exam during the second year of their academic career from a total of 21,748 relevant students 
(students enrolled in year 2006-07 were excluded because  they had not yet completed their second 
year when data were collected). 
 From data provided by the Administrative Office of the University of Calabria, we also have 
information on the number of places offered by each degree course each year and the number of 
applications received.  
 The Italian University system, with few exceptions9, does not restrict enrolment, however, 
some minimum standards, in terms of minimum number of tenured professors10 for number of places 
offered, were legally established by the 2001 University reform and have to be met by each degree 
course. As a result, each degree course is able to offer a certain number of places for new students 
according to the number of professors. Since the number of professors changes very slowly, the 
number of places offered is fairly stable over time. This is confirmed by the fact that it does not emerge 
from our data that the number of places offered by each FLD responds to the previous year’s demand. 
In fact, if we regress the number of places offered by each FLD each year on the number of 
applications received in the previous year, we do not find any statistically significant effect once we 
control for degree and year specific effects11. 
 By comparing the number of places offered and the number of applications received, we are 
able to understand whether a given FLD in a given year is experiencing an excess of supply, or not, 
and we may define a dummy variable SupplyExcessD __  which assumes value 1 when the FLD for 
the year in which student j enrolled was experiencing an excess of supply and 0 otherwise. We also 
define a variable DemandSupply −  which measures the relative size of the excess of supply or 
demand, 
fferedPlaces
nsApplicatiofferedPlacesDemandSupply
O 
O −=− . 
 On average the number of applications received each year for the FLD available at the 
University of Calabria is higher than the number of places on offer. However, as reported in Table 1, 
27% of sample students are enrolled in FLD which experienced an excess of supply during the year in 
which they enrolled.  
 In table 1A in the Appendix, it is shown that FLD facing an excess of supply are common to all 
fields, although slightly more concentrated in the Maths and Natural Sciences. They are typically small 
FLD, with an average size of 129 students (while the average size of FLD that do not have an excess of 
                                                          
9  A numerus clausus is imposed for Architecture, Medicine and Veterinary Science. None of these fields is on 
offer at the University of Calabria. 
10  The minimum number of tenured professors for the number of places offered varies according to the fields of 
study. 
11 Regression results are available upon request. 
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supply is of 243 students), and students enrolling are characterised by relatively lower ability. In fact, 
FLD receiving a number of applications which exceeds the number of places on offer admit students 
on the basis of their HSFinal. As a consequence, students who have obtained a low final grade at high 
school have a low probability of being accepted in FLD which experience an excess of demand. This 
leads to a negative correlation between SupplyExcessD __  and HSFinal.  
 
 
4. Differences in grades across degree courses. Are they due to differences in 
demand?  
 
In this section we analyse whether grades vary significantly across different degree courses and whether 
it is possible to explain grading practices with regards to demand and supply factors.  
 Grades reflect both students’ academic performance and the grading standards adopted by the 
university teaching staff in evaluating students. We start with the following simple model: 
 
[12] jetdtdtddtjjetd DSSQDDXG ενϕφδχβα +++++++= _  
 
Where jetdG  is the grade obtained in exam e by student j enrolled in year t in the FLD d.  jX  is a 
vector of individual characteristics (high school final grade, dummies for the type of high school 
attended, gender dummy and dummies for province of residence). tD  are dummies for year of 
enrolment that capture variation in unobserved characteristics over time. dD  are dummies for field of 
study (field or FLD according to the specification), which allow controling for the existence of time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity across fields or FLD. tdQ  is the average quality of students 
attending degree course d together with student i, tdS  is the average class-size of courses attended by 
student j enrolled in the degree d, DS _  is a variable measuring supply/demand conditions for the 
degree course attended by student j, jetdε  is an error term. 
 All variables have been standardised in order to make results comparable under different 
specifications and to render the interpretation of marginal effects more straightforward. All equations 
include province of residence dummies (not reported so as to save space). In all specifications, standard 
errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and since some of the variables of 
interest vary at degree level, we estimate our models clustering the standard errors at this level in order 
to avoid biased standard errors (Moulton, 1990). 
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 In column 1 of Table 2, the results are shown of OLS estimations of equation (1), which 
include fixed effects by field of study and do not consider the variable DS _ . We obtain results that 
are consistent with findings obtained by previous literature on grades. Students who have obtained 
higher grades at high school also tend to perform better in terms of grades obtained at university. 
Students who have attended a lyceum obtain the highest grades. The female dummy is not significant.  
 Class-size has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (at the 1% level), implying that 
students in larger classes obtain worse grades. An increase of one standard deviation in class-size 
reduces grades by a 0.049 standard deviation. This may be due to fact that students learn better in 
smaller groups, which allow greater interaction with instructors, and that instructors are able to make 
better evaluations of student performance by taking into account motivation and participation in 
addition to more objective criteria12. 
 The coefficient attracted by the average ability of classmates is negative and significant at 10 
per cent level, implying that students obtain lower grades in courses attended by students with higher 
ability. This result may suggest that instructors evaluate students on a relative basis and adjust their 
grading standards to the average level of ability encountered in the classroom13. 
 Coefficients (not reported) attracted by year of enrolment dummies do not support the 
hypothesis of grade inflation: grades do not appear to increase over time.  
 We observe significant differences across different fields of study. Students enrolled in 
Humanities obtain better grades compared to all other students. Differences are particularly relevant 
with respect to students enrolled in Engineering, Pharmacy and Economics. 
 Significant differences in grades are also observed across different degree courses offered 
within the same field of study14.  
 These results, showing significant differences in grades across fields and degree courses, are 
consistent with results obtained by Bagues, Sylos Labini and Zinoyeva (2008), who consider a sample 
of Italian graduates. They suggest that differences in grades are due to differences in grading standards, 
since graduates from fields and universities which award higher grades obtain lower earnings than 
graduates from fields or universities where grades are relatively low. Our data set does not provide 
information on outcomes obtained by individuals in the labour market, but some previous research 
                                                          
12 The 2001 reform of the Italian University System defined both the maximum number of students that can be 
enrolled (given the number of permanent professors) and the maximum class size for each Degree Course. As a 
consequence, we are confident that class size can be treated as an exogenous variable.  
13 A number of works have analysed peer group interaction in education showing little or no effect (see for 
example Sacerdote, 2001 and Zimmerman, 2003). The negative effect we find in this study may depend on the 
fact that our measure of peer group is a very broad one and it may not be able to describe the student peer group 
adequately. In addition, grades may not represent an adequate measure of skills acquired by students. 
14 Estimations including degree dummies are available upon request. 
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(Romita, 2003) confirms, for graduates from the University of Calabria too, that students graduating 
from high grading FLD perform worse on the labour market.  
 However, it is not clear why certain fields or universities decide to set lower academic 
standards. As suggested in the previous sections, one possible answer is that educational institutions set 
their grading standards in relation to the demand they face. To investigate this aspect we include the 
dummy variable SupplyExcessD __  among our regressors, measuring whether the degree chosen by 
student j is experiencing an excess of supply.  
Results are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. In both specifications, it emerges that students 
enrolled in FLD which are experiencing an excess of supply obtain better grades. 
As it is possible to see in column 2, controlling for class-size and for classmate quality, being 
enrolled in a FLD which is experiencing an excess of supply produces an improvement in students 
grades of 0.061 points (the effect is significant at a 5% level).  
This is consistent with our theoretical model, showing that, when funds obtained by FLD are 
partially based on the number of students enrolled, FLD facing low demand are induced to adopt easy 
grading practices in order to attract students and in order to avoid  losing resources15. 
Column 3 presents results obtained when excluding students enrolled in Engineering. Students 
enrolled in this field initially follow a common course and only select their FLD at the end of the first 
semester16. As a consequence, our measure of excess of supply is at field level for Engineering, rather 
than at FLD level. However, our main findings continue to hold true even when we exclude these 
students from our sample. 
One may question whether our results are related to differences across degree courses. To control 
for the existence of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across FLD, we include FLD dummies 
instead of field dummies in our regressions. In this way we exploit the variations in 
SupplyExcessD __  within the same FLD over time to estimate the effect of our interest. As shown in 
columns 4 and 5, which present results for the same specifications of the model discussed above, 
estimates do not change much when degree specific fixed effects are included. Results confirm that 
students obtain better grades when their FLD is experiencing an excess of supply.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 These findings also hold true when we consider the average grade gained in first year exams rather than grades 
obtained in each exam as a measure of student performance. Results are available upon request. 
16 Students enrolled in Engineering during the first semester attend common courses, while courses attended 
during the second semester depend on the FLD chosen. 
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Table 2. OLS estimates of grades including faculty or FLD specific fixed effects  
Dependent Variable: grades obtained in first year exams. 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D_Excess_Supply 
 
0.061** 
(0.028) 
0.070** 
(0.035) 
0.049** 
(0.022) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
  
Supply-Demand 
  
   0.009 
(0.018) 
 
Excess_Supply 
     
 0.058** 
0.026 
Excess_Demand 
     
 0.000 
0.021 
High school final grade 0.285***      
(0.013) 
0.285*** 
(0.013) 
0.277*** 
(0.017) 
0.287*** 
(0.012) 
0.279*** 
(0.016) 
0.287*** 
(0.012) 
0.287*** 
(0.012) 
Lyceum  0.275***      
(0.023) 
0.273*** 
(0.023) 
0.246*** 
(0.024) 
0.265*** 
(0.022) 
0.230*** 
(0.020) 
0.264*** 
(0.022) 
0.264*** 
(0.022) 
Female  0.000           
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
0.009  
(0.013) 
-0.001  
(0.013) 
-0.001  
(0.014) 
Average Classmates’  Ability  -0.038*         
(0.021) 
-0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.023 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
Class-size  -0.049***     
(0.016) 
-0.041** 
(0.017) 
-0.044* 
(0.025) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
-0.010 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
Field: Economics -0.775***     
(0.061) 
-0.768***     
(0.059) 
-0.769***     
(0.058)   
  
Field: Pharmacy  -0.879***     
(0.059) 
-0.878***     
(0.056) 
-0.869***     
(0.058)   
  
Field: Engineering -1.004***     
(0.062) 
-1.037***     
(0.061)    
  
Field: Humanities Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark     
Field: Maths and Natural Sciences -0.779***     
(0.070) 
-0.797***     
(0.068) 
-0.794***     
(0.076)   
  
Field: Political Sciences -0.356***     
(0.081) 
-0.364***     
(0.086) 
-0.363***     
(0.081)   
  
Year of enrolment Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FLD Dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Province of residence Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R_Squared 0.212 0.213 0.217 0.222 0.230 0.222 0.222 
Observations 162899 162899 118062 162899 118062 162899 162899 
Clusters 42 42 33 42 33 42 42 
Number of students 25825 25825 19555 25825 19555 25825 25825 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) and incorporating 
clustering grouped by FLD are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively 
 
 
In column 6, instead of considering the dummy SupplyExcessD __  among regressors, we 
include a variable measuring the relative size of the excess of supply/demand, 
offeredPlaces
nsApplicatioofferedPlaces
DemandSupply
−=− , to investigate whether the extent of the excess of 
supply/demand matters. It emerges that this variable produces a positive but not statistically significant 
effect on grades17. 
In order to analyse whether grades react asymmetrically to excesses of supply and demand, we 
have created two variables: the first one SupplyExcess _  if equal to DemandSupply −  when 
                                                          
17 We have checked the sensitivity of our estimates to outliers. Nothing of relevance happens when we remove 
extreme cases. 
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0>− DemandSupply  and 0 otherwise, while the other DemandExcess _  is equal to 
)( DemandSupply −−  when 0<− DemandSupply  and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in column 
7 and it emerges from them that SupplyExcess _  produces a positive and statistically significant effect 
on grades, while  DemandExcess _  does not produce a statistically significant effect.  
These results imply that grading practices are sensitive to changes in the relative size of the 
excess of supply, because, as explained above, degree courses facing difficulties in filling places may 
be worried about losing students. On the other hand, grading practices are not influenced by the relative 
size of the excess of demand, since FLD can simply reject applications rather than adjust their grading 
policy. 
  
 
5. Two-Stage Least Square Estimates 
The estimates shown in the previous section are based on the assumption that the excess of supply 
experienced by a given degree course is not correlated with the error term, which includes 
unobservable characteristics of individuals enrolled on different degree courses and (once we control 
for FLD fixed effects) unobservable time-variant degree characteristics. 
 A selection bias could be introduced if students choosing different FLD differ in some 
unobservable characteristics. For instance, students enrolled in FLD for which there is high demand 
may have higher unobservable ability or higher motivation, they may also put more effort into their 
studying activity since they know that there are a large number of people who are interested in their 
field of study and in working in similar occupations. This will create a downward bias in the estimated 
effect on grades of the variable measuring the excess of supply. On the other hand, students who enrol 
in FLD for which there is high demand may have lower unobservable ability or motivation. This would 
create an upward bias. 
 In addition, to the extent that unobserved time-variant features of FLD degree influence grades 
obtained by students this could introduce omitted variable bias. For example, the quality of the 
teaching staff may differ when an FLD is facing an excess of supply, may be because it is possible to 
involve only the best teachers in teaching activity.  
 In these cases, the association observed between the outcome variable and the explanatory 
variable of interest may be misleading as it may partly reflect omitted factors which are related to both 
variables. In short, our result (positive association of high grades with excess of supply for a FLD) 
might be explained by more highly motivated students enrolling in FLD with low demand, or it may be 
related to higher teaching staff quality when the degree faces low demand. 
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 In this section,  in order to address these potential sources of bias, we estimate the model 
explaining differences in grades in relation to the varying levels of demand for degree courses by using 
Two-Stage Least Squares and taking the total number of Italian universities offering each degree 
course18 (Total_Univ) as an instrument of the excess of supply19.  
 This variable, measuring the total supply of the degree course, should positively effect the 
probability that the same degree offered by the University of Calabria might face an excess of supply, 
but should not directly influence the grades obtained by students enrolled in the degree course we are 
considering. In fact, the number of Universities offering a certain degree should not be related to 
variations in the teaching staff quality for that degree. Similarly, the fact that a large number of 
Universities offer a certain degree course (implying that there is more likely to be an excess of supply) 
should not be related to whether students choosing that degree course at the University of Calabria are 
characterised by higher unobserved ability. As a consequence, while the Total_Univ variable should 
influence the probability that a degree course might face an excess of supply, it should not be related to 
unobserved characteristics of the specific degree course we are considering. 
 First of all, in order to check that our instrument is not ‘weak’, we have tested whether the 
instrument in the first stage regression is significantly different from zero (see Panel B of Table 3). In 
the first-stage regression in which the endogenous variable, SupplyExcessD __ , is regressed on the 
instrument and all other exogenous variables, the F-statistics, for the test of whether the instrument 
coefficient is equal to zero, are always well above the threshold value of 10 suggested by Stock and 
Watson (2003)20.  
 To check whether it is necessary to use an instrumental variable estimator, we run the Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test to verify the endogeneity of SupplyExcessD __  in OLS. We take the residuals 
from the first stage regression and insert them, as explanatory variables, into an ‘augmented’ structural 
equation. In all the specifications, which control for FLD fixed effects, this variable is significantly 
different from zero showing that OLS is not consistent and suggesting the use of TSLS. 
 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations are shown in Table 3. To correct for correlations of error 
terms across observations, we estimate standard errors using the White-Huber procedure by cluster at 
FLD level.  Panel B shows results from First Stage regressions. In all the specifications it emerges that 
Total_Univ greatly determines the variable measuring the excess of supply faced by degree courses 
offered by the University of Calabria. An increase in the number of Universities offering a given 
                                                          
18 Using a linear regression for the first-stage estimates generates consistent second-stage estimates even with a 
dummy endogenous variable (Angrist and  Krueger, 2003). 
19 These data are provided by the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca. See http://offf.miur.it/index.html 
20 The F-statistics range form 12 to 77 according to the specification adopted. 
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degree course positively effects the occurrence of an excess of supply. In fact, students who want to 
enrol on a certain degree course have may choose between a number of different institutions which 
offer it. 
 Panel A shows Two-Stage Least Squares estimations. By controlling for FLD fixed effects, we 
find that SupplyExcessD __  coefficients are always positive and highly significant. In column (1), 
student grades increase of 0.19 points when his FLD experiences an excess of supply. A similar effect 
is found when we exclude students enrolled in Engineering from our regression (see column 2). 
 
 Table 3. TSLS estimates of student’s grades  Dependent Variable: grades obtained at first year exams 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
D_Excess_Supply 0.195*** 
(0.030) 
0.170*** 
(0.059) 
  
Supply-Demand   0.070*** 
(0.059) 
0.184*** 
(0.044) 
High school final grade 0.288*** (0.013) 
0.278*** 
(0.012) 
0.287*** 
(0.009) 
0.278*** 
(0.016) 
Lyceum  0.266*** (0.022) 
0.230*** 
(0.020) 
0.264*** 
(0.022) 
0.227*** 
(0.020) 
Female 0.000 (0.013) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
Classmate  Ability  -0.013 (0.015) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
0.034*** 
(0.021) 
0.086*** 
(0.031) 
Class-size -0.006 (0.020) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
FLD Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year of enrolment Dummies YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
 
SupplyExcessD __ SupplyExcessD __ DemandSupply −  DemandSupply −
High school final grade 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Lyceum  
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
Female -0.008*** (0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.016** 
(0.003) 
Classmate  Ability  0.111*** (0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.359*** 
(0.003) 
-0.405*** 
(0.003) 
Class-size -0.125*** (0.002) 
-0.035*** 
(0.002) 
-0.296*** 
(0.003) 
-0.372*** 
(0.004) 
Total_Univ 0.233*** (0.006) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.024*** 
(0.00) 
FLD Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year of enrolment Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Province of residence Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.223 0.220 0.348 
Observations 162899 118062 162899 118062 
Number of students 25825 19555 25825 19555 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) and incorporating 
clustering grouped by FLD are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively 
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 These effects are larger than those which emerge from OLS estimates suggesting that students 
exhibit lower unobservable ability when their degree course faces an excess of supply. This is 
consistent with the idea that FLD which experience an excess of supply are not in the condition to select 
between applications and may end up accepting less motivated students who may have decided not to 
apply to their preferred FLD because of their low probability of being accepted. 
 In columns 3 and 4 , we consider the variable DemandSupply −  measuring the relative size of 
the excess of supply-demand rather than considering the dummy variable SupplyExcessD __ . This 
variable takes negative values when the degree course faces an excess of demand and positive values 
when it is experiencing an excess of supply. As shown in columns (3) and (4), which are based 
respectively on the full sample and on the sample excluding students enrolled in Engineering, it 
emerges that, once we control for endogeneity problems, the extent of the excess of supply/demand 
matters for students’ grades and grades tend to increase when the excess of supply increases. An 
increase of one standard deviation in the excess of supply improves students’ grades by a 0.70 standard 
deviation.  
 
 
6. The effect of degree courses for which there is low demand on probability of 
students’ dropping out 
 As explained in the introduction, teachers may be mainly interested in avoiding students’ dropping-
out when deciding upon their grading practices. Unfortunately we do not have information on whether 
students have decided to drop out of their university studies. However, we observe whether students 
successfully undertook exams during the second year of their degree course. As students who did not 
pass at least one exam during their second year of degree course are likely to be students who have 
decided to drop out, we use this information to measure drop-out behaviour and define a dummy 
variable Drop-out which takes value 1 when the student did not pass any exam during the second year 
of his academic studies and 0 otherwise21.  
We estimate by Maximum Likelihood, the following probit model in which the probability of 
dropping out of university studies is related to a set of conditional variables22: 
 
                                                          
21 We recognize that this is a rough measure of drop-outs, since we do not know whether students have effectively 
left their studies or if they are behind in their academic studies They may also be students who have decided to 
transfer to another university, although, this is a minor problem because generally only a few students transfer to 
other universities.  
22 We are not able to consider students who enrolled in year 2007 in this analysis since these students were still 
enrolled at the first year of their degree course in the year in which our data were collected and, therefore, we 
cannot observe whether they were able to undertake exams the year after. 
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 Our estimates are reported in Table 523.   
The probability of dropping out is higher for students who have a low HSFinal. An increase of 
one standard deviation in the high school final grade leads to a reduction in the probability of dropping 
out of about a 0.07 standard deviation. Having attended a lyceum produces a similar effect. Females 
have a lower probability of dropping out. In addition it emerges that students who have attended 
courses in larger classes have a higher probability of taking exams in the following year. A negative but 
not statistically significant effect also emerges from classmate quality. 
Being enrolled in a degree course experiencing an excess of supply reduces the probability of 
dropping out by about 2 percentage points. The same result is true when we exclude students enrolled in 
Engineering from our sample (column 2).  
In column (3) are reported results obtained when instead of considering the dummy D_Excess 
_Supply we include among the regressors the DemandSupply −  variable measuring the relative size of 
the excess of supply/demand. A negative but not statistically significant effect emerges. 
 
 Table 4. Probit estimates for students’ dropping-out   Dependent Variable: Drop-out  
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 
D_Excess_Supply -0.022*** 
0.008 
-0.014*** 
0.010 
 
 
Supply-Demand 
  
-0.007 
0.005  
Excess_Supply 
   
-0.024*** 
0.010 
Excess_Demand 
   
0.002 
0.006 
High school final grade -0.066***   
0.005 
-0.056***   
0.005 
-0.067*** 
0.005 
-0.066*** 
0.005 
Lyceum -0.065*** 
0.006 
-0.065*** 
0.006 
-0.065*** 
0.006 
-0.065*** 
0.006 
Female -0.037*** 
0.006 
-0.037*** 
 0.006 
-0.038*** 
0.006 
-0.038*** 
0.006 
Classmate  Ability -0.008 
0.005 
-0.010* 
0.005 
-0.014** 
0.007 
-0.010 
0.007 
Class-size -0.016** 
0.007 
-0.013** 
0.006 
-0.017** 
0.008 
-0.018** 
0.008 
FLD Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year of enrolment Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Province of residence Dummies     
Pseudo R-squared 0.090 0.081 0.090 0.096 
Log pseudo-likelihood -8130 -6115 -8133 -8089 
Observations 21749 16374 21749 21749 
Clusters 42 33 42 42 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. A constant is included in all regressions. Standard errors (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity) and incorporating clustering grouped by FLD are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **  
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5  percent level respectively 
                                                          
23 Very similar results are obtained when using a linear probability model. 
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In column (4) we investigate whether the probability of dropping out is influenced 
asymmetrically by excesses of supply and demand. Analogously to the results shown for grades, it 
emerges that SupplyExcess _  produces a negative and statistically significant effect on the probability 
of dropping out, while DemandExcess _  produces a positive but not statistically significant effect.  
We now turn our attention to the bias that may derive from endogeneity problems in our variable 
of interest. In Table 6 we present Two-Stage Probit estimates, using the total number of Italian 
Universities ( UnivTotal _ ) offering each degree course as an instrument.  
We follow a two step approach, in the first step a linear probability model for the endogenous 
regressor is estimated on the full vector of control variables and the instrument (Angrist, 2001) and, in 
next stage, a probit model for drop-out outcome is estimated on the full set of controls and the predicted 
values for the endogenous regression from the first stage24. The standard errors for these estimations are 
bootstrapped25. 
In controlling for FLD fixed effects,  it emerges from the Two-Stage Probit estimates that the 
variable D_Excess_Supply produces a negative and highly statistically significant effect on student 
dropping out probability. In column (1), dropping out probability diminishes by about 8 percentage 
points when students are enrolled in a FLD where there is an excess of supply. A similar effect is found 
when we exclude from our regression students enrolled in Engineering (see column 2)26.  
In column 3 the results when we consider the relative size of the excess of supply/demand are 
reported. The coefficient of the variable DemandSupply −  is negative and statistically significant 
implying that endogenity problems are especially relevant when we consider the relative size of the 
excess of supply/demand as a dependent variable, possibly because students enrolled on degree courses 
experiencing differing levels of excess/demand are heterogeneous in terms of unoberserved 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Since we have a model with a binary outcome and a binary endogenous regressor, we cannot estimate a IV 
probit model as it requires the endogenous regressor to be continuous. 
25 100 replications. 
26 We obtain very similar results using a TSLS estimation procedure. 
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Table 5. Two-Stage Probit  estimates for students’ dropping-out 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 
D_Excess_Supply -0.085*** 
0.041 
-0.075*** 
0.003  
Supply-Demand 
  
-0.022*** 
0.010 
High school final grade -0.066***   
 0.002 -0.056***   0.002 
-0.066*** 
0.005 
Lyceum -0.066*** 
0.004 
-0.054*** 
0.005 
-0.065*** 
0.004 
Female -0.038***  
0.006 
-0.046*** 
 0.005 
-0.037*** 
0.006 
Classmate  Ability -0.001 
0.006 
-0.000 
0.006 
-0.002 
0.007 
Class-size -0.025** 
0.008 
-0.022*** 
0.009 
-0.009 
0.008 
FLD Dummies YES YES YES 
Year of enrolment Dummies YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.096 0.081 0.096 
Log pseudo-likelihood -8133. -6116 -8129 
Observations 21749 16374 21749 
Clusters 42 33 42 
Notes: See Table 4. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Many European countries, including Italy, are increasingly linking university funding to the number of 
students enrolled and to the number of exams passed. This system may induce educational institutions 
to use grades strategically to attract students. In order to illustrate this idea, we have provided a simple 
theoretical framework showing that, when students positively evaluate high grades and when resources 
are allocated in relation to the number of students enrolled and the number of exams they pass, grading 
policies may be used by educational institutions not only to signal student ability and productivity to 
the labour market, but also as a variable to use in order to attract more students and obtain more 
funding. This strategy in absence of perfect information and with a signalling value of the level of 
education attained may imply only a small cost in terms of reputation for the educational institutions. 
We show that the incentive to inflate grades is higher for universities or degree courses facing low 
demand.  
This theoretical prediction has been submitted to empirical scrutiny by using a large sample of 
students enrolled at an Italian university. Studies considering this issue are not generally able to 
disentangle class-size effects from effects due to attempts by the teaching staff to attract more students. 
In fact, degree courses in low demand are also characterised by smaller classes. We are able to 
overcome this problem thanks to the quality of our data set which provides information on both the 
class-size of courses attended by each student and on the number of applications received and the 
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number of places offered by each degree course. When controlling for class-size, classmate quality and 
degree fixed effects, we show that students obtain better grades and have a lower dropping out 
probability when their degree course faces an excess of supply. This consistently with our theoretical 
predictions. 
 These findings hold true also when, in order to deal with omitted variable problems, we 
estimate our model using Two-Stage Least Squares and Two-Stage Probit respectively for estimates 
concering students’ grades and their  dropping out probability. We instrument the variable measuring 
the excess of supply/demand with the total number of Italian universities offering each degree course. 
Coefficients emerging form these estimates are higher than the OLS and Probit coefficients, suggesting 
that the latter are negatively biased, possibly because students enrolled in degrees experiencing an 
excess of supply are less motivated than students enrolled in other degrees. In fact, since FLD which 
receive a higher number of applications than places on offer only select students with high ability 
(measured with HSFinal), students enrolling in FLD with an excess of supply may be, at least partially, 
students whose applications have been rejected by more popular FLD (or who have decided not to 
apply to their preferred FLD because of their low probability of being accepted). As a consequence, 
FLD with low demand may end up with relatively unmotivated students, whose aspirations and 
abilities are not well suited to the degree course.  
Our analysis casts doubts on all those policies which presume that grading standards are based on 
common standards (for example on the legal value given to university degrees in Italy) and which 
consider student academic performance to be a proxy for the skills generated by educational 
institutions. Probably, as a result of these policies and the rules governing the allocation of funds, 
educational institutions do not use grades to signal student ability to the labour market, but, instead 
adopt them in an opportunistic way.  
Clearly these findings refer to just one university and it is not possible to derive general 
conclusions. However, as argued by Sylos-Labini et al. (2008), grade divergence is a phenomenon 
characterising the whole Italian University system and our study is an attempt to understand what 
causes this heterogenity in grading standards. We have suggested a mechanism based on 
demand/supply factors, however alternative explanations for why such heterogeneity occur cannot be 
excluded.  
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Table 1 A. List of FLD  
 Excess 
of 
supply*  
High school 
final grade 
Average 
number of 
places 
offered 
Average 
number of 
applications 
Economics Faculty     
Degree in Law and Economics No 90.935 258 620 
Degree in Economics and Social Sciences Yes 79.042 140 118 
Degree in Statistics Yes 84.729 75 64 
Degree in Economics and Business Administration No 87.715 564 659 
Degree in Economics Yes 83.366 206 197 
Pharmacy Faculty     
Degree in Nutritional Science No 86.563 118 210 
Degree in Pharmaceutical Information No 78.799 110 110 
Degree in Environmental Toxicology Yes 76.716 103 52 
Degree in Technology of Cosmetic Products Yes 79.222 103 85 
Humanities      
Degree in History Yes 74.155 106 138 
Degree in Philosophy and Human Sciences Yes 78.905 112 125 
Degree in Philosophy and Communication Sciences No 88.367 175 395 
Degree in Philosophy Yes 78.329 105 75 
Degree in Literature Yes 84.753 191 207 
Degree in Foreign Languages No 86.473 157 213 
Degree in Arts, Music and Spectacle Yes 77.897 182 242 
Degree in Education Sciences No 82.190 180 305 
Degree in History and Conservation of Arts …  No 82.547 150 200 
Degree in Linguistic Mediation No 91.581 100 178 
Degree in Primary Education Yes 77.782 250 226 
Degree in Conservation of Cultural Goods Yes 81.741 260 297 
Maths and Natural Sciences     
Degree in Chemistry Yes 85.444 55 37 
Degree in Physics Yes 88.296 55 36 
Degree in Informatics No 87.863 78 178 
Degree in Maths Yes 86.110 60 43 
Degree in Natural Sciences Yes 81.949 76 48 
Degree in Biology No 95.271 122 320 
Degree in Geology Yes 82.685 83 87 
Degree in Conservation and Restoration Technology Yes 83.035 72 78 
Degree Materials Science Yes 79.430 40 24 
Political Sciences      
Degree in Political Sciences Yes 84.565 250 331 
Degree in Social Services No 89.582 90 252 
Degree in Administration Yes 78.010 215 223 
     
*Excess of Supply in at least one of the years going from 2001-02 to 2006-07. 
 
 
 
 
